Berry,
(Perhaps we should take this to an off-topic sub-group)
Re: Can you give me an account of how rabbits recognize other rabbits,
>for mating purposes, when they only have the above to work with. (In
>practice, of course, they only have the first, and perhaps also the
>fourth.)
and: Biologists are not investigating concepts.
>They are investigating reality. They discover that this reality
>contains natural kinds, and their instances. Many of these natural
>kinds, and their instances, existed many billions of years before
>concept-using animals came on the scene. (01)
I'm sure I don't know the mechanisms of rabbit mating. I suspect it has to
do with a complex set of observable properties that, in the mind of the
rabbit, stimulates that behavior. I would even go so far as to say this
forms a "concept" of "something I can mate with" in the first rabbits mind.
Does it "know" this is "another rabbit" - I have no idea. However it works,
I don't know that I would extend this mechanism and behavior to forming some
universal truth. It is a very interesting and fortunate behavior mechanism
and one of great interest to biologists. If someone created a robot rabbit
that other rabbits would mate with is that then a rabbit?
As for "discovering realty", or perhaps "interpreting reality"; In the case
of architectures, we spend a lot of time specifying things that do not yet
exist (E.G. a new information type). We also spend a lot of time creating
approximate abstractions of things that do exist but not as a physical
entity (E.G. an "as is" business process). The focus on specification
rather then discovery is something I have noted as a distinguishing factor
in the way most "modelers" and "ontologists" approach a problem. I confuse
both camps by taking an ontological approach to modeling architectures.
I jumped-into this reacting to the assertion that identical-instances
implies identical-type (or class) because that this is simply not the
conclusion I would want from any logical system. The conclusions would
often times be wrong. The types have an equivalent extent, that is all. If
there is a need of a kind of type where this is necessarily true, define it
as another concept.
>From a use-case point of view, it is not really interesting if the "concept"
of rabbit existed before man, what is interesting is our success at
communicating information and that requires sharing concepts. To do so
requires agreement on the concept and that implies some mechanism of
identifying a concept and specification of that concept (even a weak form of
specification such as examples).
And to come back home - "class" and "type" are just terms, not the concept. (02)
-----Original Message-----
From: ontac-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
[mailto:ontac-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Smith, Barry
Sent: Sunday, January 22, 2006 3:23 PM
To: ONTAC-WG General Discussion
Subject: Re: Intension and Extension (Was RE: [ontac-forum] Type vs.Class -
last chance to vote. ) (03)
At 07:35 PM 1/22/2006, you wrote:
>Berry,
>re:
> >If 'rabbit' refers to a type, and if rabbit instances existed before
> >human beings, and if rabbits were able to recognize other instances
> >of like type (e.g. for dating purposes) then the type rabbit existed
> >before any definition was formulated. Talk of types should thus not
> >rely too much on talk of definitions/intensions. Indeed there are
> >many types in biomedicine for which definitions have not yet been
> >supplied, and many types in all domains for which incorrect
> >definitions have been (or were for many centuries) supplied.
>
>[[CBC] ] While a bunch of furry creatures may have existed long ago, the
>concept of how these individuals are related is not part of the natural
>world. (04)
Bravo, Cory, you have recognized that there were no concepts before
concept-using animals like ourselves came upon the scene.
Technically, this is called "the gem". (05)
> That we may decide that a set of individuals is sufficiently "more
>similar" such that we classify them under a common term and concept it is a
>tool WE use that is a basis for how WE think and how WE communicate. (06)
Indeed. (07)
>Certainly the first classification, one common to living things is "food",
>to a lion the distinction between "food" and "rabbit" may not even exist.
>Some pre-human may have had a thought or grunt for "Rabbit food", and thus
>was born the CONCEPT.
>When we communicate such concepts we may do so by example (see, the things
>in this box are the "rabbit" I was talking about) or by definition. Both
>are ways to communicate and clarify the concept that we have in OUR MINDS
or
>OUR logical formalisms. Classification by example appears to be how we
>learn, but isn't this discipline about being a bit more precise?
>So it would seem to me there are 5 things in play;
>* An actual thing - jumping across my lawn
>* A concept for a kind/classification/type of things - rabbit
>* A definition for the concept - Small mammal, etc.
>* Sets of things - creatures in a box
>* A set of individuals satisfying a concept - "extent".
>* Terms for the concept - EN:"Rabbit", FR:"Lapin" (08)
Can you give me an account of how rabbits recognize other rabbits,
for mating purposes, when they only have the above to work with. (In
practice, of course, they only have the first, and perhaps also the fourth.) (09)
>A concept <HAS> terms, definitions, sets and <AN> extent.
>
>What was proposed but seem invalid is that we can always deduce equivalence
>of concepts by equivalence of individuals. This would not work where there
>is more than one possible aspect of the same individual or where there is
>change. Perhaps there is a special kind of type where this kind of
>assumption can be made. This special kind of type would have to have
>individuals completely defined by a single definition and thus not
>correspond to an individual in the real world. One example of such types
is
>the enumerated types found in programming languages. "Color" may be an
>example of such a type, but I am not sure yet. I am mostly sure "Rabbit"
is
>NOT one of those types. So the more general concept is the type that does
>not contain this assumption. (010)
Biologists are not investigating concepts.
They are investigating reality. They discover that this reality
contains natural kinds, and their instances. Many of these natural
kinds, and their instances, existed many billions of years before
concept-using animals came on the scene.
BS (011)
>
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