At 04:00 PM 1/24/2006, you wrote:
>Barry,
>
>Following is an example that illustrates the kinds
>of inconsistencies that are created by having too
>many axioms. (I changed the subject line to
>reflect that point.)
>
>BS> Certainly processes have parts (subprocesses).
> > And which subprocesses of a process are unfolding
> > changes from one time to another.
>
>Up to this point, nobody would disagree. But the
>following discussion depends on axioms inherited
>from theories at a very high level of the ontology:
>
>BS> But neither a process nor its subprocesses change
> > over time. This is because a process/subprocess
> > IS a change over time. It is continuants (objects)
> > which change over time, by undergoing processes.
>
>What would you call Hurricane Katrina? (01)
Hurricanes, epidemics, bodies of radio energy moving through space,
and forest fires are not processes, but rather complex continuants
(enduring objects) which undergo changes over time.
Think of a forest fire as a pack of monkeys jumping from tree to
tree, with some monkeys dying off, quickly, at the back, and new
monkeys being born at the front. (02)
> It certainly
>retained its identity for a considerable period of
>time. During that time, it was a clearly recognizable
>entity, whose identity was sufficiently stable that
>it could be named, discussed, perceived, and identified
>by millions of observers.
>
>Like most hurricanes, Katrina was first noticed as
>a "tropical depression". As its winds increased, it
>became a "tropical storm", at which point it was given
>the name Katrina. It strengthened to become a hurricane,
>and eventually it moved across land, weakened, and
>dissipated as a storm.
>
>By the axiom that processes cannot change, Katrina
>would be classified a continuant (object). (03)
Exactly. (04)
> But it
>certainly had many process-like characteristics, (05)
so do you, John
so do many continuant entities (06)
>and it falls on a continuum with storms, dust devils,
>whirlpools, waves, ripples, and many other phenomena
>that are not usually considered objects. (07)
see above (08)
>Examples like these are the reasons why I recommend
>an upper level with very few axioms. (09)
The opinions of those who have not thought carefully about, e.g.,
epidemics, are not a reason for people who HAVE thought carefully
about epidemics to refrain from asserting what is true about
epidemics, because it contradicts with these opinions. (010)
> 1. The people who study hurricanes and the people
> who experience the effects on their homes are
> not about to consult an ontologist to determine
> whether they are being blown away by a continuant
> or an occurrent. (011)
another wise Sowa saying (012)
> 2. Axioms are certainly important for detailed
> reasoning, but the people who need a theory of
> hurricanes have vastly more data, hypotheses,
> and verified theories about such phenomena than
> anything they would inherit from an upper level. (013)
perhaps (if they are in the market for help from, say, ontology) they
need to formulate their hypotheses in a language which is
sufficiently robust, and has sufficient associated axioms, that they
can reason with them (014)
> 3. The kinds of general theories that are relevant
> to reasoning about hurricanes and other phenomena
> belong to mathematics and physics. (015)
Ontologies are designed to support interoperability, including
interoperability across the boundaries where physics meets other
disciplines, e.g. meteorology. (016)
> Those theories
> are usually very specialized, there are large numbers
> of them, and they tend to change frequently (on at
> least a yearly basis). They don't belong at an
> upper level, but they do belong in a large collection
> of optional modules that can be introduced, as needed,
> for any particular problem. (017)
I do not want to include 'hurricane' at the upper level. (018)
But I do want to include 'process' and 'continuant', and I want to
have axioms relating processes to change (they don't), and relating
continuants to change (they do). I do not believe that the existence
of people with ill-considered opinions about, say, hurricanes counts
at all against this. (019)
>As I said before, I am not against having some axioms
>at the upper levels, but they should mainly be used for
>classification rather than detailed reasoning. And even
>for classification, there are many serious questions
>created by borderline cases, such as hurricanes and
>other physical phenomena. (020)
How does this work, exactly? How can such borderline cases affect the
truth of an axiom about an upper-level type like process? (021)
>Summary: The physicians' motto, "Primum non nocere"
>(First, do no harm), implies that in cases of uncertainty,
>the physician should take no action that would worsen the
>patient's condition. I am afraid that many axioms and
>distinctions that are being proposed for an upper-level
>ontology violate that principle. (022)
Processes do not change (023)
does not violate that principle.
Does any other axiom I, or anyone has propounded, do so?
(Your reading of the 'First, do no harm' principle comes too close, I
fear, to 'Do nothing') (024)
> Instead of clarifying
>the problem, they often introduce distractions, confusions,
>and inconsistencies that make it worse. That doesn't mean
>we should have no upper-level axioms, but they should be
>used mainly for classification, not for detailed reasoning. (025)
It means that we should be careful.
BS (026)
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