Chris, (01)
As I said many times before, we agree on the mathematical
and logical principles. But we differ on what we should
do with those principles and why. (02)
CM> I guess one reason I'm pushing the simple definition
> is that there will then be no divide between the
> theoretical and the practical notions. (03)
The theoretical focuses on the principles. The practical
focuses on the purpose. By ignoring the divide, you're
throwing out everything practical. (04)
CM> Oh, nonsense -- intensional logic (with an "s") is
> in large measure exactly the logic of intentionality
> (with a "t"). That hardly came about by logicians
> shrinking from notions of purpose and like. (05)
You're preaching the Montague party line. I first read
his papers in the early 1970s, and I was very impressed
by their power and elegance. But I also noticed the
following comment (Montague 1967): (06)
"It has for fifteen years been possible for at least
one philosopher (myself) to maintain that philosophy,
at this stage in history, has as its proper theoretical
framework set theory with individuals and the possible
addition of empirical predicates." (07)
Note his grudging acceptance of "empirical predicates",
which, he believed, are not as fundamental as sets. (08)
Around the same time, I came across a paper by a psycholinguist
named John Limber, who recorded the sentences uttered by his
daughter Laura. Following is an example of one of her utterances
at age 34 months: (09)
When I was a little girl, i could go "Geek, geek" like that,
But now I can go "This is a chair." (010)
Not all her sentences were so elegant. But her speed in learning
puts all our AI systems to shame. We don't have anything that
can approach that level of ability, and *nothing* that Montague
or his ilk has done can do anything like that. For reference, (011)
http://pubpages.unh.edu/~jel/JLimber/Genesis_complex_sentences.pdf (012)
I can't believe that Montague's IL captures any aspect of what's
going on in Laura's head. (013)
CM> And that goes for ontological engineering as much as anything.
> But, once again, that has nothing to do with the presence of
> intentional notions in the mathematical foundations of the
> discipline. (014)
That's what I have been trying to say: It's barren and empty
because it avoids the foundations of meaning, namely *purpose* .
Tarski was a brilliant logician from whom we all learned a lot,
but his version of "semantics" does not capture *meaning* ! (015)
CM> All I'm proposing is that we develop the same sort of clean,
> clear formal foundation for ontological engineering that
> Newtonian mechanics provides for mechanical engineering. (016)
You're boiling the chicken until all the meat falls off and
admiring the nice clean bones. (017)
CM> Sometimes, according to you, ontologies are identified by
> their axioms, sometimes by their consequences. (018)
No. The conditions are very clear: the axioms determine the
theory, and the purpose makes the theory an ontology. (019)
John (020)
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