ontac-forum
[Top] [All Lists]

Re: [ontac-forum] Theories, Models, Reasoning, Language, and Truth

To: "ONTAC-WG General Discussion" <ontac-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
From: "Azamat" <abdoul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Sat, 17 Dec 2005 12:16:18 +0200
Message-id: <009b01c602f2$ebf41160$f802960a@az00evbfog6nhh>
John,
 
I don't see any irreconcilable differences in our positions. Moreover, your interpretation and views well complement the traditional theory of signs (Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Lock, ... well, Peirce also); namely, there are natural signs (factual entities) related as cause and effect; mental or cognitive signs (the content and processes of the mind); and conventional signs (symbols), where the levels are interconnected by meaningful relationships such as interpretation, representation, description, denotation, reference, and truth.
 
Just check again my conclusions and yours:
 
AZAMAT: ''There are things as such as well as natural and intentional or conventional signs, like a verbal sign getting its deep meaning from the real entity signified...''. ''All words, writen and spoken, are symbols of thoughts and images, which are the shared mental experiences of the things in the world''. 
 
JOHN: ''What we are fundamentally dealing with are signs.  There is no question that there does exist something independent of our minds, but what it is can only be experienced through signs, analyzed by means of signs, and classified by means of signs''.
 
Regards,
Azamat
PS: Annd thanks for your interpretation of my theses, it is good as usual.
 
----- Original Message -----
From: "John F. Sowa" <sowa@xxxxxxxxxxx>
To: "ONTAC-WG General Discussion" <ontac-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Saturday, December 17, 2005 3:52 AM
Subject: Re: [ontac-forum] Theories, Models, Reasoning, Language, and Truth

> Azmat,
>
> I spoke precisely:
>
> JS> ... everything I see is a sign, everything I feel is
> > a sign, everything I think is a sign, and everything I
> > say is a sign.  It's all signs all the way down.
>
> AA> Actually, not every thing is a sign, rather 'every
> > sign is also a thing'.
>
> A thing is not a sign until it is perceived by some sentient
> being -- which could be as lowly as a bacterium.  But every
> thing that is perceived is perceived by means of a sign,
> which may be just a sign of itself.  But more likely it is
> a sign of just some aspect of the thing, such as an image,
> a feeling, a change in temperature, pressure, sweetness,
> salinity, etc.
>
> AA> I. There are things that are merely things,
>
> That may be true, but they cannot be *known* unless they are
> (a) perceived by their signs, (b) interpreted by means of
> other signs (e.g., percepts, concepts, words, sentences, etc.),
> and (c) tested by means of actions to determine their nature.
> See Section 7 of the theories.htm paper:
>
>   
http://www.jfsowa.com/logic/theories.htm
>    Theories, Models, Language, Reasoning, and Truth
>
> AA> all acting as the ultimate references and meanings in Real
> > (Ontological) Semantics;
>
> That raises many, many very serious questions.  See the above
> paper, especially the issues of how language is related to theories,
> how theories are related to models, how models are related to the
> world, and how scientific methods are use to test hypotheses.  But
> those 13 pages are just a brief intro.  I would recommend Peirce's
> works for more detail.
>
> AA> There are things that are also signs of other things...
>
> Everything perceived is a sign at least of itself, but interpreting
> what that "self" may be requires more than just one sign.
>
> AA> There are things that are always signs, as words and other
> > symbols signifying things via mental signs...
>
> That also requires interpretation.  When the Mayan ruins were first
> explored, the symbols that represented words could not be distinguished
> from mere decorations, which are signs of a different sort.  And even
> when writing is recognized as writing, it can also be interpreted in
> many different ways, including as decoration (calligraphy).  Even when
> the writing is known to be writing, its meaning may be ignored for
> many purposes, such as transmission across a network.
>
> There are many, many different kinds of signs of signs of signs.
> For an overview, I recommend the following:
>
>   
http://www.jfsowa.com/ontology/ontometa.htm
>    Ontology, Metadata, and Semiotics
>
> In my note to Chris, I was making the point that the debates pro and
> con various forms of "representation" are fundamentally misguided
> because there is no sharp distinction.  For example, some people say
> that logic is representational, but neural networks are not.  That,
> however, makes a sharp dichotomy that obscures rather than clarifies
> the underlying issues.
>
> What we are fundamentally dealing with are signs.  There is no question
> that there does exist something independent of our minds, but what it is
> can only be experienced through signs, analyzed by means of signs, and
> classified by means of signs.
>
> John
>

 
John made rather sweeping generalizations:
''everything I see is a sign, everything I feel is a sign, everything I think is a sign,
and everything I say is a sign.  It's all signs all the way down.'
 
Actually, not every thing is a sign, rather 'every sign is also a thing'. So more secure is here to stick to the traditional Augustine's theory of signs based on the threefold division of things:
I. There are things that are merely things, all acting as the ultimate references and meanings in Real (Ontological) Semantics;
II. There are things that are also signs of other things, as some natural signs [causally related as smoke and the fire] and the things of the human mind, thoughts, concepts and ideas, feelings and images, functioning as the senses in Conceptual and Pragmatic Semantics;
III. There are things that are always signs, as words and other symbols signifying things via mental signs (Aquinas), studied by Linguistic Semantics and exploited by Semantic Web Ontologies.
 So there are things as such as well as natural and intentional or conventional signs, like a verbal sign getting its deep meaning from the real entity signified,  but of couse not 'in its use in the language' (Wittgenstein).
So then all words, writen and spoken, are symbols of thoughts and images, which are the shared mental experiences of the things in the world.
 
Azamat Abdoullaev
EIS Ltd
Pafos, CYPRUS 
_________________________________________________________________
> Message Archives:
http://colab.cim3.net/forum/ontac-forum/
> To Post: mailto:ontac-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Subscribe/Unsubscribe/Config: http://colab.cim3.net/mailman/listinfo/ontac-forum/
> Shared Files: http://colab.cim3.net/file/work/SICoP/ontac/
> Community Wiki: http://colab.cim3.net/cgi-bin/wiki.pl?SICoP/OntologyTaxonomyCoordinatingWG

_________________________________________________________________
Message Archives: http://colab.cim3.net/forum/ontac-forum/
To Post: mailto:ontac-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subscribe/Unsubscribe/Config: 
http://colab.cim3.net/mailman/listinfo/ontac-forum/
Shared Files: http://colab.cim3.net/file/work/SICoP/ontac/
Community Wiki: 
http://colab.cim3.net/cgi-bin/wiki.pl?SICoP/OntologyTaxonomyCoordinatingWG    (01)
<Prev in Thread] Current Thread [Next in Thread>