Dear Cory, (01)
See below. (02)
Regards (03)
Matthew West
Reference Data Architecture and Standards Manager
Shell International Petroleum Company Limited
Shell Centre, London SE1 7NA, United Kingdom (04)
Tel: +44 20 7934 4490 Mobile: +44 7796 336538
Email: matthew.west@xxxxxxxxx
http://www.shell.com
http://www.matthew-west.org.uk/
> >
> > > Barry & Matthew,
> > > Well, it is obvious why there has been such problems
> creating an upper
> > > ontology!
> > >
> > > Frankly, you both seem to be attempting to impose overly specific
> > > constraints on necessarily general concepts.
> >
> > MW: I would rather say that we are setting out the
> particular requirements
> > our different core ontologies have. You correctly notice
> that there is not
> > one sense of type we would agree on, though there is something more
> > lightly
> > constrained that perhaps both of us could build from. But
> do note that
> > this
> > is the level at which 3D and 4D ontologies part company.
> >
> > > We need to have
> > > a methodology
> > > that admits valid concepts into our Ontology, not argue about
> > > ultimate truth
> > > and attempt to ban all other modes of thought.
> >
> > MW: The problem of course is that both Barry and I would
> not admit that
> > some of the others concepts were valid in a single
> ontology. This is why
> > John's lattice of theories needs to be an important part of what is
> > done so that these inconsistent ontologies can be related
> to each other
> > (rather than merged - which just doesn't work).
> > >
> > > This has to do with JS's minimal axioms in the core, but it
> > > also has to do
> > > with recognizing properly distinct concepts and NOT trying to
> > > "own" the cool
> > > general words.
> >
> > MW: I agree about the minimum axioms. As to "owning" cool
> words, as far as
> > I can see what we have done so far is vote that we will use the word
> > "type"
> > without having said what we will use it for. We need some
> axioms to tie it
> > down a bit (but there can still be problems of different
> interpretations).
>
>
> [[CBC] ] Perhaps we could agree on intent - that the term
> "type" represents
> the most general concept of expressing commonality between
> individuals. (05)
MW: That sounds reasonable, but we still need something more general
that says "here are some things" in an abstract way. (06)
>
> > >
> > > Phrases like "Hurricane Rita's sustained winds have increased
> > > to 85 mph,
> > > making it a Category 1 hurricane" show that there are
> > > concepts of things
> > > (and types) in a 3d sense, but the concept of "Hurricane
> > > Rita" in 4d exists
> > > as well, it certainly exists for Matthew. Not the same
> > > concept. Both are
> > > concepts that exist, both are specializations of a more
> > > general concept of
> > > type.
> >
> > MW: If there were 3D objects, but there aren't, only 4D
> ones (at least
> > according to a 4 Dimensionalist account). So both of them cannot be
> > contained
> > in a single consistent theory (Barry cuts and pastes the
> bits he likes
> > from
> > 3D and 4D for different parts of his ontology).
> >
> > MW: This is where the lattice comes into its own. It allows
> you to collect
> > the
> > objects and axioms of a 4D ontology into one place, and a
> 3D ontology in
> > another
> > place in such a way that anything that is shared can be.
>
> [[CBC] ] I have to admin ignorance here; I don't understand
> why these are
> incompatible. I have been taking this on faith based on the
> deep thought
> many of you have put into the subject. To the not quite
> casual observer it
> would seem that both the concept of "Hurricane Rita" as a
> life-cycle object
> and "Hurricane Rita" as it is now (or at any snapshot in
> time) are valid and
> compatible, but not the same. (07)
MW: The similarity you see is because it is the same real world
phenomena that accounts are being given of. But one says physical
objects are extended in time and the other says they are not. So
the accounts are clearly not compatible. What I would expect is that
it is relatively easy to map between them though. So a state of a
4D extent at a point in time can be mapped to a 3D object as it
passes through (is indexed at) that same point in time.
>
>
> > >
> > > Likewise the "natural types" are a foundation of science, but
> > > certainly not
> > > the only kinds that exist. Why must we exclude the others?
> >
> > MW: Barry is just as entitled to exclude things he does not
> like from his
> > ontology
> > as I am. Indeed we both need to exclude some things or else
> they won't
> > work.
> > >
> > > The argument seems to be an attempt to own the word, not
> > > define the concept.
> >
> > MW: No it has really been exploring the different
> pre-conceptions we have
> > of what the term should represent - since nothing was
> provided when we
> > voted
> > on what term to use.
> [[CBC] ] It was defined by reference. Perhaps incompatible
> reference :)
> Perhaps, instead of a single aspect of type we look at type
> as HAVING an
> extent (a set) and HAVING a set of definitions and an
> instance as HAVING a
> lifetime and HAVING a current state there is less conflict. (08)
MW: That looks closer to how I would see things, but I suspect
you just get different arguments. (By the way it is safer to use
individual when you mean things existing in space-time, types
can be instances of other types). (09)
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