Dear Cory, (01)
See below. (02)
Regards (03)
Matthew West
Reference Data Architecture and Standards Manager
Shell International Petroleum Company Limited
Shell Centre, London SE1 7NA, United Kingdom (04)
Tel: +44 20 7934 4490 Mobile: +44 7796 336538
Email: matthew.west@xxxxxxxxx
http://www.shell.com
http://www.matthew-west.org.uk/ (05)
> -----Original Message-----
> From: ontac-dev-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> [mailto:ontac-dev-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx]On Behalf Of Cory Casanave
> Sent: 27 January 2006 13:13
> To: 'ONTAC Taxonomy-Ontology Development Discussion'
> Subject: RE: [ontac-dev] Representation of attributes
>
>
> Barry & Matthew,
> Well, it is obvious why there has been such problems creating an upper
> ontology!
>
> Frankly, you both seem to be attempting to impose overly specific
> constraints on necessarily general concepts. (06)
MW: I would rather say that we are setting out the particular requirements
our different core ontologies have. You correctly notice that there is not
one sense of type we would agree on, though there is something more lightly
constrained that perhaps both of us could build from. But do note that this
is the level at which 3D and 4D ontologies part company. (07)
> We need to have
> a methodology
> that admits valid concepts into our Ontology, not argue about
> ultimate truth
> and attempt to ban all other modes of thought. (08)
MW: The problem of course is that both Barry and I would not admit that
some of the others concepts were valid in a single ontology. This is why
John's lattice of theories needs to be an important part of what is
done so that these inconsistent ontologies can be related to each other
(rather than merged - which just doesn't work).
>
> This has to do with JS's minimal axioms in the core, but it
> also has to do
> with recognizing properly distinct concepts and NOT trying to
> "own" the cool
> general words. (09)
MW: I agree about the minimum axioms. As to "owning" cool words, as far as
I can see what we have done so far is vote that we will use the word "type"
without having said what we will use it for. We need some axioms to tie it
down a bit (but there can still be problems of different interpretations).
>
> Phrases like "Hurricane Rita's sustained winds have increased
> to 85 mph,
> making it a Category 1 hurricane" show that there are
> concepts of things
> (and types) in a 3d sense, but the concept of "Hurricane
> Rita" in 4d exists
> as well, it certainly exists for Matthew. Not the same
> concept. Both are
> concepts that exist, both are specializations of a more
> general concept of
> type. (010)
MW: If there were 3D objects, but there aren't, only 4D ones (at least
according to a 4 Dimensionalist account). So both of them cannot be contained
in a single consistent theory (Barry cuts and pastes the bits he likes from
3D and 4D for different parts of his ontology). (011)
MW: This is where the lattice comes into its own. It allows you to collect the
objects and axioms of a 4D ontology into one place, and a 3D ontology in another
place in such a way that anything that is shared can be.
>
> Likewise the "natural types" are a foundation of science, but
> certainly not
> the only kinds that exist. Why must we exclude the others? (012)
MW: Barry is just as entitled to exclude things he does not like from his
ontology
as I am. Indeed we both need to exclude some things or else they won't work.
>
> The argument seems to be an attempt to own the word, not
> define the concept. (013)
MW: No it has really been exploring the different pre-conceptions we have
of what the term should represent - since nothing was provided when we voted
on what term to use. (014)
> Lets put qualifiers on these more specific concepts and let
> the experts
> provide the axioms that differentiate them. (015)
MW: I think we need something at the top that is about having members/instances
and is agnostic about whether membership changes over time. Both Barry and I
are interested in things that are more restricted than that, but in different
ways, that I expect you have picked up are incompatible.
>
> Finally, we understand that multiple dimensions of context
> can change how a
> concept is interpreted and therefore axiomized. Local truth
> is more common
> than global truth. (016)
MW: I just plain disagree with this. There is nothing local about either
3 Dimensionalism or 4 Dimensionalism. Both are capable of supporting other
"local" views. They compete to be a theory of the underlying reality. (017)
> When there is a substantially different
> way of looking
> at the same concept, lets just separate this into a context
> and, again, let
> the experts create he axioms that define and differentiate
> that context. (018)
MW: If we stop talking about a context and start talking about a node
in the lattice that collects the different theories each ontology uses
into one place, then you have the right idea. (019)
MW: We also need to add the mapping that allows you to translate from one
ontology to another.
>
> So if we combine 3 tools we can, perhaps overcome the
> problems of some of
> the prior efforts;
> * Minimal axioms in the core
> * Differentiate concepts aggressively and as part of our method
> * Apply context to select more specific axioms (020)
MW: Nearly right (see immediately above on context).
>
> -Cory
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: ontac-dev-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> [mailto:ontac-dev-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of West, Matthew R
> SIPC-DFD/321
> Sent: Friday, January 27, 2006 4:13 AM
> To: ONTAC Taxonomy-Ontology Development Discussion
> Subject: RE: [ontac-dev] Representation of attributes
>
> Dear Barry,
>
> See below.
>
>
> Regards
>
> Matthew West
> Reference Data Architecture and Standards Manager
> Shell International Petroleum Company Limited
> Shell Centre, London SE1 7NA, United Kingdom
>
> Tel: +44 20 7934 4490 Mobile: +44 7796 336538
> Email: matthew.west@xxxxxxxxx
> http://www.shell.com
> http://www.matthew-west.org.uk/
>
>
> > > >
> > > > membership
> > > >
> > > > 1. the number 4 is a member of the set {4, the moon, Napoleon}
> > > > 2. there is no corresponding type
> > >
> > >MW: Why? Surely a trivial type listing the members can be
> > constructed.
> >
> > Leaving aside administrative domains (e.g. tax collection), types,
> > like instances, are discovered. They are out there in reality. They
> > form the subject-matter of scientific inquiry.
>
> MW: Well I would say that there is an abundance of sets out there and
> some of them have greater significance than others.
> >
> > > >
> > > > 3. Harvey is a member of the set of rabbits
> > > > 4. Harvey is also an instance of the type rabbit.
> > > > It is in virtue of 4. that 3. is true.
> > > >
> > > > We see that there are cases of set-membership where there is no
> > > > counterpart to 4. Hence set membership is at least a
> wider notion.
> > >
> > >MW: Yet membership would not be time indexed whilst
> instance_of could
> > >be (for you at least). Sounds to me as if each is narrower
> than some
> > >common core. Can I assume (correctly) you consider that
> they have the
> > >same properties in terms of transitivity and the like?
> >
> > I offered my two pennies' worth on this here:
> > http://ontology.buffalo.edu/bio/logic_of_classes.pdf
> > esp. pp. 6ff.
>
> MW: That was interesting. The only axiom I have to object to is the
> one that says there are some particulars that are not instances (of a
> class). I can live with some universals that are not classes since
> for us relations are universals. I notice there is no empty class,
> but that can easily be added in a more specific ontology.
>
> MW: The problem for you as I see it is that you cannot impose your
> interpretation of a class to exclude as classes things that you do not
> consider to be such, but I might. You can only say you have a
> different
> intended interpretation.
>
> > > >
> > > > > > Types have instances.
> > > > > > We represent these instances using various means, e.g.
> > > > English words
> > > > > > ('red', 'bright red') or hexadecimal numbers, or what
> > you will.
> > > > > > Sometimes our representations are more precise, sometimes
> > > > less. They
> > > > > > may still all be correct (as it may be equally
> correct to say:
> > > > > > 'animal over there', or 'cat at fifty paces').
> > > > >
> > > > >MW: I think I have mostly grasped what you mean by a
> > type, surprising
> > > > >as it has been to me. Just one last clarification here.
> > I presume you
> > > > >agree there are some types whose membership does not change,
> > > > i.e. your
> > > > >type and set have the same members, e.g. integers and
> > real numbers.
> > > >
> > > > If integer is a type, then the set of its instances is
> > indeed always
> > > > identical to the set of its instances. And ditto for
> > 'real number'.
> > >
> > >MW: So one possibility here might be for me to settle for
> types whose
> > >instances didn't change over time, and just forget about the "sets"
> > >as uninteresting.
> >
> > Quine used to talk about desert landscapes. You, it seems,
> are pining
> > for desert landscapes from which all traces of the biological have
> > been eliminated (even, I suppose, the oil and gas underneath).
>
> MW: Quite the reverse, I am saying there is every possible set you can
> imagine (and probably more) and that you are just identifying some as
> useful for some purpose.
> >
> > >MW: My problem now is that I understand that you want types to be
> > >restricted to things like rabbits, not "people with 376
> > hairs on their
> > >arms" or "4, the moon, and me". Now, whilst I am sympathetic
> > >to the idea of natural kinds, it seems to me that these
> > three examples
> > >actually sit in a spectrum and there is no clear divide
> between them
> > >(though these three being prototypical can be easily
> distinguished).
> >
> > There are many terms for which we have clear examples of entities
> > which fall under them, clear examples of entities which do not fall
> > under them, and then a penumbra of problematic cases in between.
> > Responses to this problem for 'type' might be:
> >
> > 1. it is hard work to find out which types exist (this work
> is called
> > 'science') (BS)
> > 2. we should refrain from formulating axioms about what is
> a type (JS)
> > 3. 'type' is redundant; we should talk of sets instead, keeping our
> > heads under the desert sand to avoid all sight e.g. of
> > anything biological (MW)
>
> MW: Well as usual you indulge in gross misrepresentation when
> all else
> fails.
>
> MW: In a 4D world I am happy to concede that there will be a
> set of sets
> that corresponds to what you would refer to as types. (With
> an abundance
> of sets of course its there). In your 3D world you seem to need these
> things to be able to have varying membership over time. That
> is simply
> a problem I don't have.
>
>
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