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RE: [ontac-dev] What is "An Ontology"?

To: "ONTAC Taxonomy-Ontology Development Discussion" <ontac-dev@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, "Chris Menzel" <cmenzel@xxxxxxxx>
Cc:
From: "Obrst, Leo J." <lobrst@xxxxxxxxx>
Date: Fri, 20 Jan 2006 18:45:52 -0500
Message-id: <9F771CF826DE9A42B548A08D90EDEA80B83964@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Montague and other model-theoretic natural language semanticists
downstream have always characterized his intensional logic formulation
as dispensable, i.e., it was a useful tool but not really necessary,
just technically convenient [1].     (01)

However, let me remind you of the general state of natural language
semantics back then: it was a general hodge-podge of "my semantic
features" vs. "your semantic features", and the argumentation was
endless (hmmm, now that I think of it, we have a current correlate ;).
You can read a number of general intros by Barbara Partee on those
days, e.g., [2], as we've talked about before. This was prior to the
rise of model-theoretic methods introduced largely by Montague (and
building on Kripke, etc.) After Montague, there was real advancement in
formal NL semantics.     (02)

Mainstream transformational-generative linguistics focused (still
focus) primarily on formal syntax, and formal semantics was secondary,
derivative. Except for the Montague Grammar strand, which evolved
through the Barbara Partee/Emmon Bach/David Dowty days to the
categorial/unification frameworks of the 80s to
Moortgat/Morrill/Carpenter and others type-theoretic categorial
reformulations, Kamp/Heim/Link/Landman/Krifka, etc., i.e., formal
natural language semantics, the mainstream Chomsky school semantics has
largely remained stuck on hodge-podge features (lexical semantics ala
Jackendoff et al).     (03)

By the above, I just want to demonstrate a long if recent tradition in
formal semantics in linguistics. People need to know that some of these
same issues have played out in logic, philosophy of language, formal
ontology, formal NL semantics, and now perhaps ontological engineering.    (04)


And of course you know of the general disputation between
model-theoretical semanticists and formal ontologists (the latter:
there are no sets; there are chairs and water and hope and ...) In
fact, that is the issue you raise, I think.     (05)

Purpose/intention in linguistic semantic theory is placed on the formal
pragmatics side of the semantics-pragmatics continuum, i.e., semantic
interpretation in context with respect to the intention of the
speaker/writer, i.e., speech acts/discourse theory.    (06)

Thanks,
Leo    (07)

[1] Dowty, David; Robert Wall; Stanley Peters. 1980. Introduction to
Montague Semantics. Springer-Verlag. 
[2] Partee, Barbara. 1996. The Development of Formal Semantics in
Linguistic Theory. In Lappin, ed., The Handbook of Contemporary
Semantic Theory, Blackwell, Oxford, UK, and Cambridge, MA, 1996, pp.
11-38.
_____________________________________________ 
Dr. Leo Obrst       The MITRE Corporation, Information Semantics 
lobrst@xxxxxxxxx    Center for Innovative Computing & Informatics 
Voice: 703-983-6770 7515 Colshire Drive, M/S H305 
Fax: 703-983-1379   McLean, VA 22102-7508, USA     (08)


-----Original Message-----
From: ontac-dev-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
[mailto:ontac-dev-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of John F. Sowa
Sent: Friday, January 20, 2006 2:05 AM
To: Chris Menzel
Cc: ONTAC Taxonomy-Ontology Development Discussion
Subject: Re: [ontac-dev] What is "An Ontology"?    (09)

Chris,    (010)

As I said many times before, we agree on the mathematical
and logical principles.  But we differ on what we should
do with those principles and why.    (011)

CM> I guess one reason I'm pushing the simple definition
 > is that there will then be no divide between the
 > theoretical and the practical notions.    (012)

The theoretical focuses on the principles.  The practical
focuses on the purpose.  By ignoring the divide, you're
throwing out everything practical.    (013)

CM> Oh, nonsense -- intensional logic (with an "s") is
 > in large measure exactly the logic of intentionality
 > (with a "t").  That hardly came about by logicians
 > shrinking from notions of purpose and like.    (014)

You're preaching the Montague party line.  I first read
his papers in the early 1970s, and I was very impressed
by their power and elegance.  But I also noticed the
following comment (Montague 1967):    (015)

    "It has for fifteen years been possible for at least
    one philosopher (myself) to maintain that philosophy,
    at this stage in history, has as its proper theoretical
    framework set theory with individuals and the possible
    addition of empirical predicates."    (016)

Note his grudging acceptance of "empirical predicates",
which, he believed, are not as fundamental as sets.    (017)

Around the same time, I came across a paper by a psycholinguist
named John Limber, who recorded the sentences uttered by his
daughter Laura.  Following is an example of one of her utterances
at age 34 months:    (018)

    When I was a little girl, i could go "Geek, geek" like that,
    But now I can go "This is a chair."    (019)

Not all her sentences were so elegant.  But her speed in learning
puts all our AI systems to shame.  We don't have anything that
can approach that level of ability, and *nothing* that Montague
or his ilk has done can do anything like that.  For reference,    (020)

    http://pubpages.unh.edu/~jel/JLimber/Genesis_complex_sentences.pdf    (021)

I can't believe that Montague's IL captures any aspect of what's
going on in Laura's head.    (022)

CM> And that goes for ontological engineering as much as anything.
 > But, once again, that has nothing to do with the presence of
 > intentional notions in the mathematical foundations of the
 > discipline.    (023)

That's what I have been trying to say:  It's barren and empty
because it avoids the foundations of meaning, namely *purpose* .
Tarski was a brilliant logician from whom we all learned a lot,
but his version of "semantics" does not capture *meaning* !    (024)

CM> All I'm proposing is that we develop the same sort of clean,
 > clear formal foundation for ontological engineering that
 > Newtonian mechanics provides for mechanical engineering.    (025)

You're boiling the chicken until all the meat falls off and
admiring the nice clean bones.    (026)

CM> Sometimes, according to you, ontologies are identified by
 > their axioms, sometimes by their consequences.    (027)

No.  The conditions are very clear:  the axioms determine the
theory, and the purpose makes the theory an ontology.    (028)

John    (029)


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