See the posting of Ken Ewell's recent note, and my comments. (01)
In particular: (02)
I agree with what Ken is saying. He and I know each other’s minds well
enough to interpret properly and see the agreements and slight
disagreements. (03)
In this case, there is only a need to clarify about what might he and I mean
by “knowledge” computing. (04)
Clearly, in my reading of his words – at least - he is not supporting the
types of classical philosophical logic based on classes and membership. (05)
John (Sowa), you seem comfortable with these notions (classes and sets) and
I cannot see why you are? Perhaps you can explain? (06)
>From rough and fuzzy sets to forcings on axiomatic structures; there has
been a lot of work done to show that classical notion of set membership and
class membership fails to provide a foundation for knowledge computing. (07)
Degeneracy, as Edelman points out, is one of the open problems. (08)
Polylogics is something that approaches the issue of response degeneracy
that I asked Barry, Mathew, Ralph and Jim about. But this type of work
cannot see the market because the market is really not open to alternatives
(innovation) that start with the assertion that Aristotle’s logic cannot
model complex reality in a way that would support general knowledge
computing. I am hoping to change this resistance. (09)
It is suggested in private notes that I have alienated everyone. I try not
too, but somehow the practices of this community in establishing private
languages, such as the use of the letters “HIT”, has to be commented on.
And if an agreement is referenced by literatures that are not accessable
then, will then perhaps one might be able to complain? (010)
Why should we pretend that progress is made when it is not; or that things
should be simple to understand properly when things are confused by where we
are in history. This issue of not facing the truth is why Penrose titled
his 1989 book, The Emperor’s New Mind”, in reference to the fable “The
Emperor who wore no cloths.? And if the chair of the working group insists
on not acknowledging the universal judgment that a single upper ontology is
not realizable, well why is it not proper to chastise him about this. (011)
The fact is that I and Ken actually propose a single “substructural
ontology” might be possible if we approached ontology (the theory of
reality) in a stratified fashion. (012)
But as long as the issues of (human) interpretation and (physical/event)
emergence are not addressed in most of the literature that the chair and
others site; then Ken and I can not talk about substructural aggregation,
Peirce and entailments other than “inference”. (013)
But I do not mean to offend anyone personally. It is the content of the
communications that I am engaging. (014)
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