[Top] [All Lists]

Re: [ontac-forum] Re: Semantic Layers (Was Interpretation of RDF reifica

To: "Chris Menzel" <cmenzel@xxxxxxxx>
Cc: ONTAC-WG General Discussion <ontac-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
From: "Azamat" <abdoul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Fri, 31 Mar 2006 19:23:51 +0300
Message-id: <004901c654df$83cf9f20$f802960a@az00evbfog6nhh>
Chris,    (01)

Still you evade giving your rendition. See some comments as interspersed. 
About the source references and general framework of meaning, look up my 
edits in Wikipedia, Meaning (linguistic, nature) and Wikipedia, Sign and 
Wikipedia, Quantity. Add you interpretation, if it is not there now, for i 
know that you have a deep understanding of this complicated subject.    (02)

With respects,
Azamat    (03)

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Chris Menzel" <cmenzel@xxxxxxxx>
To: "Azamat" <abdoul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: "ONTAC-WG General Discussion" <ontac-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>; 
<hhalpin@xxxxxxxxxxx>; <semantic-web@xxxxxx>; <fmanola@xxxxxxx>; 
<pfps@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>; "John F. Sowa" <sowa@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Friday, March 31, 2006 1:07 AM
Subject: Re: [ontac-forum] Re: Semantic Layers (Was Interpretation of RDF 
reification)    (04)

> On Thu, Mar 30, 2006 at 01:37:57PM +0300, Azamat wrote:
>> Chris,
>> It is a standard account of meaning dimensions from authoritative
>> sources, dictionaries and references.
> Well, I wasn't objecting to the dimensions of meaning you identify so
> much as the glosses you provided for them.
>> But i am very intrigued to read your rendition from 'a great deal of
>> the relevant literature.'
>> Please find below very instructive works written by Mario Bunge (how to
>> formalize natural language, semantics and pragmatics within a single
>> foundation ontology):
>> 1. Semantics I: Sense and Reference, D. Reidel Publishing Co.; Dordrecht,
>> Boston (1974)
>> 2. Semantics II: Interpretation and Truth, D. Reidel Publishing Co.;
>> Dordrecht, Boston (1974)
>> 3. 'The Relation of Logic and Semantics to Ontology', Journal of
>> Philosophical Logic N3, (1974)
> Thank you for the suggestions, Azamat.  It seems to me that if you are
> relying upon a single, rather idiosyncratic source like Bunge, it might
> explain the disconnect here.
(Of course, you might be relying on
> others, but the fact that you only cite Bunge suggests he has influenced
> you significantly.)    (05)

His philosophical position is badly skewed, with tendency to scientific 
factualism and Quine's nominalism. Still his views of the world are the most 
comprehensive and scientific and systematic: ontology, epistemology, 
psychology, semantics, natural language, sociology, sociobiology, all is 
analyzed and subjected to mathematical formalization. But his formal 
perfectionism appears so deep and abstruse to the general reader that he 
considers him an esoteric philosopher and prefers to run away to simple 
trivialities. You just need to excogitate  his ideas,  over many years, like 
Aristotle's writings, to get to the bottom of his conceptual world.    (06)

In fact, I rather admire Bunge's work, especially
> his emphasis on the construction of rigorous formal theories but, for
> good or ill, he has not been terribly influential, and his ideas are
> somewhat outside the mainstream.  I do not intend this to be dismissive
> -- perhaps we should all be paying Bunge far more heed.    (07)

Precisely so, if we don't want to chew the cud, and present immature 
thoughts as upper schemas, web ontologies, unifying languages, just to get 
nowhere.    (08)

I am only
> trying to explain my claim that your brief account of meaning did not
> square well with "a great deal of the relevant literature".  My comments
> about modality and intentionality in my response to you were based upon
> the huge body of literature on modality, intentionality, intensional
> logic, the semantics of natural language, and AI that has accumulated
> since Frege, and which has grown exponentially since the development of
> "Kripke" (i.e., "possible world") semantics, the culmination of the work
> of Prior, Kanger, Hintikka, Dummett, and others in the 50s.  In addition
> to Kripke's own work, I have in mind in particular the work of Montague,
> Hintikka, Lewis, Kaplan, Stalnaker, Kamp, Putnam, Chisholm, Searle,
> Salmon, van Benthem and others.  While it is true that the semantics of
> statements involving intentional verbs indicating "mental attitudes
> towards states, actions or changes" have been analyzed in terms of
> Kripke semantics (e.g., Hintikka's account of belief, and applications
> of it to AI by Moore, Halpern and others), there is simply not the sort
> of essential connection between modality and the intentional attitudes
> that you suggest, and the basic semantics of modal languages itself, as
> reflected in the literature noted, has nothing whatever to do with them.
> I thought it important to point this out, as your post suggested
> otherwise.    (09)

I believe you understood that the term of modality was implicitly used as a 
linguistic relation (mood, mode), rather than a logical relation implying 
necessity, possibility and contingency. If not, then i must be more 
> Regards,
> Chris Menzel
>> ----- Original Message ----- 
>> From: "Chris Menzel" <cmenzel@xxxxxxxx>
>> To: "ONTAC-WG General Discussion" <ontac-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>> Cc: "Harry Halpin" <hhalpin@xxxxxxxxxxx>; <semantic-web@xxxxxx>;
>> <fmanola@xxxxxxx>; "Adrian Walker" <adrianw@xxxxxxxx>;
>> <pfps@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>; "John F. Sowa" <sowa@xxxxxxxxxxx>
>> Sent: Thursday, March 30, 2006 1:58 AM
>> Subject: Re: [ontac-forum] Re: Semantic Layers (Was Interpretation of RDF
>> reification)
>> >On Thu, Mar 30, 2006 at 01:23:38AM +0300, Azamat wrote:
>> >>The whole matter is not thus complicated as you think. The talking
>> >>point is that meanings have several basic aspects or dimensions or
>> >>quantities: extensional, intensional, pragmatic and modal.  Intension
>> >>is about a primary meaning or significance, basic definition and
>> >>content and all the essential implications and relations involved;
>> >>while extension relates to special, child classes or individual
>> >>entities. Modality implies mental attitudes towards states, actions or
>> >>changes usually indicated by lexical verbs. Pragmatics is about
>> >>sentence utterances in the context of discourse, human or machine.
>> >>Thus additionally to syntactic and semantic aspects, there is a
>> >>pragmatical meaning involving an agent's intentions and communicative
>> >>acts and understanding of communication. As John Sowa defines: 'a sign
>> >>is an entity that indicates (represents) another entity to some agent
>> >>(a human, animal or robot) for some purpose', in [Ontology, Metadata,
>> >>and Semiotics]
>> >
>> >You realize of course that all four of the notions you are describing
>> >briefly above are fraught with controversy and, moreoever, that several
>> >of your own glosses do not jibe with more or less standard treatments.
>> >Notably, vast expanses of the modal landscape have nothing whatever to
>> >do with mental attitudes (which are usually dealt with under the rubric
>> >of "intentionality" with a "t").  It's all well and good that you have
>> >your own account of how everything fits together, but it might be
>> >beneficial at least to acknowledge that your account is your own, and
>> >that it does not necessarily square with a great deal of the relevant
>> >literature.
>> >
>> >Regards,
>> >
>> >Chris Menzel
>     (010)

Message Archives: http://colab.cim3.net/forum/ontac-forum/
To Post: mailto:ontac-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Shared Files: http://colab.cim3.net/file/work/SICoP/ontac/
Community Wiki: 
http://colab.cim3.net/cgi-bin/wiki.pl?SICoP/OntologyTaxonomyCoordinatingWG    (011)
<Prev in Thread] Current Thread [Next in Thread>