>Re: The problem with things like these philosophical kind of
>divergences at the upper-middle level is that ordinary ideas like
>'physical object' or 'human' turn out to have different properties
>in the different frameworks. (01)
Quite. These 'ordinary' notions are never quite as ordinary-seeming
once they get formalized. (02)
>This seems to confuse divergence of terms with divergence of concepts. (03)
Im not sure I follow your distinction here. Do you mean that there is
a single concept of, say 'human', and that the various approaches are
just different terminologies? Because if so, that is not correct.
There isnt a single notion of (for example) 'human', or 'physical
object', etc.. There are many, and they are genuinely different. (04)
> We certainly know the binding of term to concept is context sensitive (05)
Again I don't follow. What do you mean by 'context' here? I wasn't
intending to refer to any notion of context that I understand. (06)
>- but the concepts enumerated are not the same and do not, in my
>mind, point to "philosophical kind of divergences". They are
>divergences in the binding of the term to the concept. (07)
No, they are differences between different concepts. The idea of a
continuant and of (as it is sometimes called) a 4-d worm, are
absolutely, irreconcilably, at odds with one another. If you believe
in one of them, the other is *logically* impossible. (08)
> The simpler ontology does not have the fully developed set of
>concepts (human-A-continuant, human-A-occurrent) but maps well to
>one of those concepts - so I don't see the incompatibility. (09)
The details of the incompatibility have been thoroughly explored.
Basically, a continuant is the same thing at different times, so in
the 4-d view of things its properties can't change: but they do.
There was an edited version of a long email discussion about this
stuff at (010)
http://ontology.teknowledge.com:8080/rsigma/dialog-3d-4d.html (011)
(although that link seems now to be broken, there is a backup copy at
http://www.ihmc.us/users/phayes/Endurantism&PerdurantismDebate2002.pdf)
and you might find this interesting reading also: (012)
http://colab.cim3.net/file/work/SICoP/resources/UpperOntologyUseLong.doc (013)
Pat (014)
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