To Pat (Cassidy) –
I had the same thoughts as you wrt the suggestion that one might
substitute a
mapping between upper ontologies for an upper ontology proper – that for
this to be effective it would have to be a de facto meta-upper ontology. One
thing my time working on CYC really brought home to me was what a holistic
entity such an elaborate and richly axiomatised ontology is (by which I mean
that a small change, such as a new assertion, particularly at the upper level,
has the potential to alter any number of inferences in previously unanticipated
ways). Thus I don’t see how any kind of ‘mapping’ is going to
account for the semantics of a system of such complexity without reproducing
some kind of structure of equal complexity.
To John – you
outline a very plausible series of criteria for non-inclusion in an upper
ontology (criteria reproduced below). However, my concern is that you are going
to end up with an empty set!! I don’t see how you can simultaneously
claim to be taking on board Quine’s criticisms of Carnap (i.e. effectively
destroying the concept of an analytic truth) AND claim that you are committed
to upper ontologies which contain only analytic truths. I just don’t get
it.
Give me an
example of something you _would_
put in there J
Cheers,
Cathy
*************************************************
[…]Following
are some kinds of axioms that should
*not* be in the
upper levels:
1. Any
axioms that make empirical claims that might be
falsified by future experiments or any claims that are
known to be false in detail, but which may be useful
approximations for many purposes. For example, the upper
levels should be neutral with respect to a Newtonian view
vs. any more modern theory of physics because for many
practical purposes a Newtonian description is accurate
within the granularity of the usual measuring instruments.
2. Any
axioms that require, prefer, or rule out one kind of
representation over another, such as a four dimensional
vs. a (3+1) dimensional description of space and time.
3. Any
axioms that rule out exceptional cases that may be rare,
but possible. For example, it should not say that a tiger
has four legs, because some tigers might be born with more
than four and some might lose a leg. In fact, there might
be quadriplegic tigers that get around in some prosthetic
device.
4. Any
axioms that imply a vase and the clay it consists of
are or are not identical, because many respectable theories
make different claims in that regard. They should also
avoid all claims about whether a child is identical or not
identical to the adult at some later stage of life -- because
some theories say yes, others say no, and other treat the
question as context-dependent (i.e., identical for inheritance
issues, but not identical for employment). In fact, the
entire issue of identity claims is so full of conflicting
philosophical positions that the upper levels should *not*
make any identity claims of any kind.
5. Any
axioms that imply physical objects and processes are
disjoint. Some theories say they must be disjoint, others
say they may overlap, and others say that object and process
descriptions are complementary ways of describing the same
phenomena.
6. Any
axioms about artifacts that may be falsified by developments
in technology. For example, the attached phone.gif example is
taken from a dictionary published in 1969, but very few of the
features depicted are common in the telephones manufactured
today. However, the definition in that dictionary is still
true: "an instrument for reproducing sounds at a distance."
7. Any
axioms that distinguish essential properties from accidental
properties. This issue has been debated since the time of Plato
and Aristotle. The traditional definition of Human is Rational
Animal, and the ability to laugh was considered an accidental
property. However, many philosophers have claimed that the
ability to laugh is just as characteristic of humans and more
easily defined than the ability to reason. Today, genes are
considered more fundamental to what is "essential", but that
makes it harder to distinguish humans from chimps and bonobos.
A truly neutral upper level should avoid any commitment to what
is considered essential vs. what is considered accidental.
When you start to
analyze the issue, the number of possible conflicts becomes so large, that the
safest position with regard to any axiom in the upper levels is very
short: When in doubt, leave it out.